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My experiences with the ratification ofthe Strategic Anus Reduction Treaty, the Threshold
Test Ban Treaty, and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty have led me to conclude
that presenting technical issues early in the process greatly reduces their politicization during the
ratification end game. This chapter summarizes the important issues that will be raised during the
debate on ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It uses a compact question and
answer fonnat to cover the following topics: 1. Nuclear Proliferation, n. Nuclear Arms Control, III.
Warhead Reliability and Yield for National Security, IV. Warhead Safety, V. Verification, and VI.
The Verification-Compliance process. Each section begins with a statement of conclusions, fol
lowed by a set of relevant questions and answers.

I. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Conclusions:
For 40 years, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been considered the quid pro
quo by the 175 non-nuclear weapon states (NNWSs) for them to end their sovereign right to
develop nuclear weapons. Without cooperation by the five nuclear weapon states (NWSs), the
NNWSs will limit their participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and in
other non-proliferation arenas. The CTBT and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are
forever politically linked in the global regime to prevent nuclear proliferation by creating a norm
that outlaws nuclear weapons programs, by negating confidence in untested though unsophisti
cated weapons, and by preventing development of sophisticated fission and fusion weapons. In
support of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the NWSs have offered security assurances to the
NNWSs outside the context of bloc alliances.

Question L 1: Comprehensive Test Ban TreatylNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Linkage
What language in the NPT, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), and the Threshold Test
Ban Treaty (TTBT) links a ban on nuclear testing and the NFT requirement that forbids NNWSs
from establishing nuclear weapons programs?

Answer 11:
LTBT Preamble (1963): "Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explo
sions of nuclear weapons for all time ..."

*I would like to thank S. Fetter, M. Nordyke, D. Schroeer, Richard Scribner and P. Zimmerman
for comments on the draft manuscript.
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NPT (1968) and TTBT (1974) Preambles: "Recalling the detennination expressed
by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty ... to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all
test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this
end,"
TIBT Resolution ofRatification (September 1990): "... the United States shares a
special responsibility with the Soviet Union to continue the bilateral Nuclear
Testing Talks to achieve further limitations on nuclear testing, including the
achievement of a verifiable comprehensive test ban."
Since progress on banning all nuclear tests had not been fulfilled by 1990, the LTBT States
Parties convened an Amendment Conference at the United Nations (UN). The Mexican Working
Paper ofAugust 24, 1990 captured the views of many NNWS participants at the Conference on the
linkage between the CTBT and the NPT:
A comprehensive test ban treaty would make the single most important contribu
tion toward strengthening and extending the international barriers against the
proliferation of nuclear weapons ... the continued testing of nuclear weapons by
the nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty would put the future of the Non
Proliferation Treaty beyond 1995 in grave doubt.
This consideration was the driving force at the LTBT Conference behind the final vote of
74 to 2 (the United States and United Kingdom against, with 19 abstentions) in January 1991 on
the proposition that the "States Parties were of the view that further work needed to be undertaken.
Accordingly, they agreed to ... resuming the work ofthe Conference at an appropriate time." To
a large extent the NWSs' promise of a CTBT was the factor that convinced the NNWSs in May
1995 to indefinitely extend the NPT-without dissent-and thus give up their sovereign right to
develop nuclear weapons for all time. In order to strongly remind the NWSs of their CTBT prom
ise, the 195 NPT States Parties adopted a set of objectives that politically committed them to con
clude a CTBT "no later than 1996." In August 1995 France and the United States stated their
intention to establish a "zero yield threshold" CTBT by seeking a complete ban on nuclear explo
sions. This strengthening ofCTBT criteria clearly supports Article VI of the NPT, but the United
States stated this commitment without linking it to the NPT. In September 1996, in a near unani
mous vote of 158 to 3 (India, Bhutan, and Libya against), the UN General Assembly accepted the
CTBT without amendment for signature. It is rare to find such a consonant momentum in global
decision making on national security affairs. By December 1996 over 130 nations had signed the
CTBT.

Question 1.2: Comprehensive Test Ban TreatylNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty World Norm
How will the cmT and NPT affect the political will and internal debate of a state con
sidering the option of starting a nuclear weapons program? How would the existence of a cmT
in force affect the responses of the world's states to a nuclear weapon test by either a CTBT Party
or by a non-CTBT Party?
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Answer 12:
Without a CTBT, it will be difficult to sustain the NPT, which discriminates between the
"haves" (the nuclear weapon states) and the "have-nots" (the non-nuclear weapon states). Without
both a CTBT and an NPT, it will be difficult for some national leaders to restrain calls to establish
a nuclear weapons and testing program. If a state cannot test the nuclear research products of its
scientists, it will be less likely to allow the development of the weapons in the first place. A viable
CTBTINPT regime will strengthen international cooperation on proliferation by enhancing the
IAEA, by enhancing export monitoring, and by supporting those who would foreclose the nuclear
weapon option in their countries. In addition, the CTBTINPT regime strengthens the political will
of the states of the world to establish harsh sanctions against any States Party that established
nuclear weapons and testing programs. States Parties that have signed the CTBT, but have not yet
ratified the Treaty, are obligated by Article 18 ofthe Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to
refrain from acts that would defeat a treaty's "object and purpose" in the intetval between signa
ture and entry into force. Clearly this constrains the signatories from testing nuclear weapons even
if the CTBT has not entered into force.

Question 13: Constraints on the Non-nuclear Weapon States
How does the CTBT constrain the technical nuclear capabilities of a non-nuclear weapon
state?

Answer 1.3:
A relatively unsophisticated, first-generation nuclear weapon can be developed without
testing, l but a state would not know with certainty its reliability and yield. If a state wished to
have reliable, compact nuclear weapons for deployment on missiles, it is generally believed that
testing would be required to secure this as a viable military option. If a state cannot test such
weapons, it would be much less likely to develop them.
In 1974 India tested a nuclear weapon, an act that greatly influenced the United States to
tighten its nuclear export policies with the passage of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.
It is generally believed that three legally defined NNWSs (as defined in Article IX.3 of the NPT)
have nuclear weapons (Israel, India, and Pakistan).
Most assume that it is necessary to test boosted primaries and hydrogen bombs to obtain a
reliable, deliverable arsenal-in contrast to certain first-generation fission weapons. It would be
easy to detect and identify tests of hydrogen bombs and of full-scale boosted primaries, since such
tests would produce a yield greater than 1 kiloton TNT equivalent. Thus the CTBr greatly
constrains the three de-facto NWSs and the NNWSs from developing hydrogen bombs.

Question 14: Nuclear Weapon State Positive and Negative Security Assurances
What are the positive and negative security assurances offered by the nuclear weapon states
in support of the 1995 NPT extension?
.

Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons After the Comprehensive Test Ban (Oxford: SIPRI, Oxford
University Press, 1996).
1
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Answer 1.4:
Positive· Security Assurances: The five NWSs declared they "would have to act immedi
ately through the [UN Security] Council to take measures to counter such aggression or remove
the threat of aggression.,,2 This type ofunspecified action is not legally binding.
Negative Security Assurances: The five NWSs declared they would not use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against any NNWS party to the NPT except in the case of an attack (with
conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction) by that NNWS on the NWS or its allies
"carried out or sustained ... in alliance or association with a nuclear weapon-state.,,3 Since this
specific lack of action was promised as part ofthe NPT renewal process, it is generally believed to
be legally binding in accordance with the 1996 decision by the International Court of Justice.

n. NUCLEAR ARMS CON1ROL
Conclusions:
The CTBT is both a nonproliferation and an arms control treaty. The CTBT constrains the
NWSs from augmenting their arsenals with further technical advances. For China, this means
forgoing an advanced missile system equipped with multiple independently-targetable reentry
vehicles (MIRVs). The United States and the Soviet Union conducted 85% of all nuclear tests,
and thus have an advantage in residual knowledge over all other states on infonnation obtained
from tests. The collapse of Russia's nuclear infrastructure has produced a large U.S. lead in such
residual knowledge.
Banning nuclear testing reduces tensions between the NWSs; by contrast, conducting
nuclear tests raises tensions. Without a CTBT one can expect other NWSs to begin testing anew.
A global ban on testing was negotiated in the context of reductions in the numbers of U. S. and
Russian deployed nuclear weapons. Under START II, the United States will retain over 9000
warheads, with 3500 of them deployed and accountable.

Question 11.1: Constraints on the Nuclear Weapon States
If the nuclear weapon states do not test nuclear weapons, how does this constrain their
plans to modernize with new, untested warheads?

Answer 11.1:
The U.S. force structure is adequate by almost any yardstick one can imagine when
discussing possible missions; therefore the United States does not need to develop new types of
nuclear weapons. By not being able to test, it is very unlikely that the NWSs will be able to
develop and deploy new types of weapons, thus freezing the present levels of technology. For
China, which has not yet deployed a viable, long-range MIRVed system, a CTBT would constrain
such plans. If one NWS began to test, others would most likely follow.

2 G. Bunn and R. Timerbaev, "Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States," Program for
Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, no. 7 (September 1996), University of Southampton, UK.
3

Bunn and Timerbaev, "Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States."
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Question IL2: Past Tests by the Nuclear Weapon States
How much have the five nuclear weapon states tested in the past?
Answer IL2:
During 1962, the first year after the 195"8-61 testing moratorium, nuclear testing reached its
maximum rate, with the United States conducting 96 tests and the Soviet Union 79. The United
States last tested nuclear weapons in 1992 (6 times) and the Soviet Union last tested in 1990
(once). The United States and the Soviet Union carried out 85% of all tests to date. Only the
United States currently maintains its nuclear infrastructure with vigor. Listed below are the num
ber and aggregate yields of nuclear tests by the five NWSs. India conducted one underground test
in 1974 with a yield of 10 kilotons.
Table 10.1
Historical record of nuclear testing by the five nuclear weapon states

United States
USSR
France
United Kingdom
China
Total

Number of
Tests
1030
715
210
45
45
2045

Percent of
Total
50.3
34.9
10.3
2.2
2.2

Yield (of all
atmospheric)
141
247
8
10
21.9
427.9

Yield (of all
underground)
38
38
0.9

4
1.5
82.4

Yield
(of all tests)
179
285
8.9
14
23.4
510.3

Data shown in this table do not include the 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki explosions and the 1974
Indian explosion. Yields are given in units of megatons (million of tons) high explosive (TNT)
equivalent.
Source: R. Norris and W. Arkin, "NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Known Nuclear Tests World Wide,
1945-1995," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 52 (M:ay/June 1996): 61-63; and "Factfile," Arms
Control Today 26 (August 1996): 38.

Question IL3: Relations between the Nuclear Weapon States under a Comprehensive Test Ban
How could a CTBT reduce contentiousness among the five nuclear weapon states?
Answer IL3:
One would expect that a permanent ban on nuclear tests would improve relations between
the five. NWSs by avoiding the following problems: (1) Since nuclear testing is in part a political
act, testing by one NWS causes other NWS governments to respond politically, lest they appear to
be weak to their own citizens. (2) Since nuclear testing is in part a technical act, it would be inter
preted as a strengthening of the ability of one state to attack another. Therefore, if an NWS were
to begin again to test nuclear weapons, the other NWSs would most likely resume their testing pro
grams, for both political and technical reasons.
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Question IL4: Nuclear Weapon State Nuclear Forces
In order to assess the military implications ofthe strategic balance between the five nuclear
weapon states, what are their present and planned nuclear force structures?
Answer IL4:
Under present planning, the total number of nuclear weapons will drop from 1991 numbers
of about 23,000 for the United States and about 38,000 for the Soviet Union to perhaps about
10,000 each under START II. The data below cover the weapons that can be launched on a
moment's notice plus nondeployed nuclear weapons.

Table 10.2
Numbers of strategic, non-strategic, and non-deployed warheads comprising
the nuclear forces ofthe United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

(9/90)
(10/96)
(START I)
(START II)

USSR (9/90)
Russia (10/96)
Russia (START 1)
Russia (START IT)

U.K. (1996)
France (1996)
China (1996)

NonTotal
ICBM SLBM Bomber Strategic Strategic
2450 5760
4508
12,718
7100
1200
2090 3264
3048
8402
950
1400 3456
7856
3000
500 1680
3500
950
1320

6612
3577
2960
605

°07

Reserve/
Inactive
3400
7100
5000
5000

Total
23,000
17,000
14,000
9,000

2804
2272
1840
1696

1363
820
1000
800

10,779
6669
5800
3101

11,000
4400
2750
2750

16,000
9000
5000
5000

38,000
20,000
14,000
11,000

160
384
12

0
0
0

160
384
19

100
65
376

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

260
449
395

The notation "n.a." indicates that the data are not available to the author, or not yet determined.
Totals for the U.S., USSR and Russia were rounded to the nearest 1000 to reflect uncertainty in the
nonstrategic and reserve categories.
Source: R. Norris and W. Arkin, "NRDC Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,
July 1996," Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists 52 (July/August 1996): 61-63; and "NRDC Nuclear
Notebook: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 52
(NovemberlDecember 1996): 64-67; J. Mendelsohn and C. Cerniello, "Factfile," Arms Control
Today 26 (October 1966): 28-29; START Memoranda of Understanding; J. Cirincione (Henry L.
Stimson Center), private communication; The Military Balance 1994-1995, published by Brassey's
(UK) Ltd. for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1994; START Treaty, Senate
Executive Report 102-5, September 18, 1992; and START II Treaty, Senate Executive Report
104-10, December 15, 1995.
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The 1994 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review sets aside some 2500 "hedge" weapons to upload
the Minuteman ills from one to three warheads, to upload the Trident SLBMs (submarine
launched ballistic missiles) from five to eight warheads, and to add warheads to the B-52H and
B-1 bombers. In addition, the review states that the United States should maintain some 2,500
"inactive" weapons, which have their tritium removed but are intact and available for future
deployment. Thus, the U.S. total under START IT is over 9,000 warheads: 4450 deployed (or able
to be deployed on short notice) and about 5000 that could be deployed after systems are modified
to accept them in a period of a months to a few years.

m. WARHEAD RELIABILITY
Conclusions:
The JASON Study and the U.S. nuclear-weapon laboratory directors have certified that the
Both agree that the Stockpile Stewardship and Manage
ment Program should be able to maintain this status without nuclear testing. In the unlikely event
that this is not true or does not continue to be true, the United States can withdraw from the CTBT
under its "supreme national interest" clause.
This section first discusses the JASON Study conclusions, warhead designs in the present
U.S. arsenal, and the historical contrast of the 1958-61 moratorium. The definition and analysis of
warhead reliability is then examined, including the Department of Energy (DOE) warhead defect
data and the critical, related issue of missile reliability. Of the missions to which the U.S. nuclear
forces could be tasked, a first strike against another NWS requires the highest degree of weapon
reliability.

u.s. stockpile is now reliable and safe.

Question IlL J: The Technical Assessment of the JASON Study
What did the JASON Study conclude in 1995 on the necessity for further nuclear testing to
maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent?

Answer III 1:
For many years the JASON Group, composed ofindependent, senior, non-government sci
entists, has advised the U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy on technical aspects of national
security issues. The unanimous report from the group of 14 prominent scientists, including four
DOE weapon designers, concluded that (in brief): (1) The JASON Committee has high confidence
in the safety, reliability, and performance margins of the present U. S. nuclear stockpile, which will
continue to be needed for deterrence. (2) The United States can maintain the quality of its nuclear
weapons with the Science-Based Stockpile ~tewardship and Management Program, which does
not include nuclear testing. (3) The range of performance margins of the weapons is adequate at
this time, and changes should be made to a weapon type only under extreme circumstances.
(4) Continued testing under 500 tons TNT equivalent would only marginally assure the quality of
the weapons, and much less so than the Stockpile Stewardship Program. (5) Experiments with
high explosives and fissionable material that do not reach criticality are useful in improving our
understanding of the behavior of weapon materials. (6) In the past, probl,ems that occurred were
primarily the result ofincomplete or inadequate design activities. The JASON Group is convinced
that those problems have been corrected and that the weapon types in the enduring stockpile are
safe and reliable in the context of explicit military requirements. (7) The above conclusions are

.
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consistent with the CTBT, recalling the fact that the United States has the option to withdraw
under conditions of"supreme national interest."4

Question III. 2: U.S" Nuclear Warheads in the Enduring Arsenal
What warheads will be in the "enduring" U.S. force structure after 2003, and what are the
presently planned quantities, type, yield, date of introduction into the stockpile, and laboratory
custodianship.

Answer III. 2:
Table 10.3
Warhead designs comprising the U.S. arsenal after the year 2003.
Lead laboratories are Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)

Design
B61/4, B61111
B6117
B83
W62

Number

600
750
650
610

W76
W78.

3000
920

W80/1
W8010

1400

W84
W87
W88

350

400
525

400

Type
tactical bomb
strategic bomb
strategic bomb
:MM: ill (ICBM)
Trident C4 (SLBM)
:MM: ill (ICBM)
ALCM*
SLCM*
GLCM*
MX(ICBM)
Trident D5 (SLBM)

Yield
170 kt
300 kt
1.2Mt
170 kt
100 kt
335 kt

150 let
150 kt
50 kt
300 kt
475 kt

Lab with
Date Introduced
. in Arsenal
Custodianship
1980
LANL
1986
LANL
LLNL
1983
1970
LANL
1979
LANL
LANL
1980
LANL
1981
1984
LANL

1983
1986
1988

LLNL
LLNL

LANL

*The W80/1, W8010, and W84 warheads were designed for deployment on air-launched cruise
missiles (ALCMs), sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and ground-launched cruise missiles
(GLCM), respectively.
Source: Norris and Arkin, "NRDC Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, July

1996."
Question 111.3: 1958-61 Testing Moratorium.~ the Modernization Era
Were there large technical changes to then relatively new types of U. S. warheads during
the 1958-61 testing moratorium? How is the situation different in 1997?

"Nuclear Testing," Jason Report #JSR-95-320, Mitre Corporation, McLean, VA (August 3,
1995).

4
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Answer IlL 3:
Major, impressive changes were taking place in the U.S. nuclear arsenal when the morato
rium of 1958 was established: (1) The hydrogen bomb technology was then relatively new (the
first deliverable thermonuclear weapon was tested in 1954). Several years were required to deploy
smaller hydrogen bombs. (2) The first boosted primaries were tested in 1955. (3) In 1955, com
pact, light warheads assembled with sealed pits and deployable on missiles required new designs
providing for one-point safety.
In contrast to the 1958-61 moratorium, the United States now has had an additional 35
years and a total of 1000 tests to attain its present nuclear stockpile, which has not changed signifi
cantly in design for a number ofyears.
Question IlL 4: U.S. Department ofEnergy Definition ofReliability
What is DOE's definition of reliability for nuclear weapons?
Answer IlL 4:
"In general tenns, reliability is defined as the ability of an item to perfonn a required func
tion. Implicit in the above definition of 'required function' for one-shot devices, such as nuclear
weapons, are the required conditions and duration of storage, transportation, and function. Also
implicit in the above definition of 'ability' is the concept of successful perfonnance. Successful
performance for nuclear weapons is defined as detonation at the desired yield (or higher) at the
target (i.e., desired burst height or desired delay time within the desired CEP [circular error proba
bility]) through either the primary or any designed backup mode of operation.,,5
Question IlL 5: Reliability Tests
How reliable are U.S. nuclear weapons? Has the United States performed enough nuclear
tests to prove that its warheads are, say, 90% reliable with 90% confidence?
Answer IlL 5:
There have not been enough perfonnance nuclear tests to establish a statistical reliability
value with great confidence for any specific warhead type in the enduring arsenal. For example, if
ten perfonnance tests were carried out and all were successful, there would still be a 30% chance
that the weapon would be less than 90% reliable, and a 10% chance that it would be less than 80%
reliable. 6
In the years when the United States tested some 20 times per year only one or two tests
were for reliability. Considering that the United States has had some 30-40 different warheads
types, there has clearly not been sufficient nuclear reliability testing to quote a reliability value
even with a medium level of confidence for a particular warhead type, and certainly not as a func
tion of time for warheads deployed more than two years.

S H. Zerriffi and A. Makhijani, "The Nuclear Smokescreen: Warhead Safety and Reliability and
the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program," Institute for Energy-Environmental Research,
Takoma Park, MD (May 1996).

6 S. Fetter,

Toward a Comprehensive Test Ban (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988).
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In general, non-explosive tests have been the most important way to determine the status of
warheads. This is particularly true for warheads that have been in the stockpile for over two years.
Question IlL 6: Actionable Defect Types
What is the DOE record of"actionable defect types" associated with the safety and reliabil
ity problems for the u.s. weapon stockpile?

Answer 111.6:
Since the Department ofEnergy has built over 50,000 warheads, the operational and main
tenance record gives indications of possible future problems with warheads. According to DOE,
an "actionable defect type (AnT) is defined as a defect type which reduces the reliability assess
ment for the nuclear weapon in which it occurs or which results in some action to remedy the de
fect type or prevent future occurrence of the defect type. Often a defect type is interdicted before
enough infonnation (sufficient number of occurrences) has been collected to indicate that the
reliability should be reduced. Therefore, not all ADTs have an associated reliability reduction."7
In response to a freedom of infonnation request, DOE stated that of the 164 ADTs, they
had the following distribution of reduced reliability (AR): O<.6.R<I% (112 ADTs); 1%<L\R<5%
(37); 5%<L\R<10% (6), and 10%<.6.R<100% (9).8 However, DOE states that they cannot specify
the absolute reliability R because DOE does not carry out sufficient nuclear tests to do this.
After looking at the ADT data, I have reached the following conclusions: (1) Older war
heads that had generic problems have been retired. This was particularly true for the early
warheads at the time of the 1958-61 moratorium. (2) Aging has not affected the safety ofthe war
heads. The aging effects on reliability of current warheads were in the arming/firing/safeing, the
parachute, the gas transfer, and the neutron generator systems. None of these problems needed
nuclear testing to resolve them. (3) The primary is much more sensitive than the secondary. The
problems with primaries have been design or production problems, which mostly show up within
a few years of entrance into the stockpile. Generic problems have been solved over time and can
be monitored in the future without nuclear testing. Under a finding that there is a threat to the
"supreme national interest," the United States can always withdraw from the CTBT. (4) If one
uses a realistic mission-oriented values for reliability and yield, aging is not likely to be a factor
for the weapons over their lifetimes. If, to save money, one wishes to extend the lifetimes of the
warheads from, say, 20 years to 40 years, then the weapons will have to be monitored closely.
(5) Non-nuclear testing is far more cost effective than nuclear testing to detennine the statistics of
the fraction of the stockpile affected by a potential problem.

Question III. 7: Missile Reliability
For U.S. nuclear weapon systems, do the missiles or warheads have the larger failure rate?

Answer III 7:
The reliability of a warhead is generally concluded to be greater than the reliability of a
missile to arrive on target with good accuracy. If, for example, the reliability of a missile is 0.9

7

Zerriffi. and Makhijani, "The Nuclear Smokescreen."

S

Zerriffi and Makhijani, "The Nuclear Smokescreen."

123
and that of a warhead is 0.95, the missile would have twice the failure rate (F) of the warhead
[F(mi~sile) / F(warhead) = (1 .0.9) / (1 ·0.95) = 0.1/0.05 = 2], producing twice as many missile
failures as warhead failures. For the case of 97.5% warhead reliability and 0.9 missile reliability,
the missile failure rate is four times that of the warheads. The lower bound of missile reliability
used by the Congressional Budget Office was 0.8, a value that gives failure rate ratios twice as
high as those quoted above. 9 The most significant improvement to the reliability of the entire
weapon would be to increase missile reliability.

Question III 8: Competence o/Weapon Designers
Assessments of the reliability and safety of nuclear weapons will often require judgment
calls based on experience. How will the United States maintain the continuing competence of
weapon designers under a CTBT?

Answer III 8:
It is widely expected that shifting the emphasis of the DOE's nuclear weapons program to
non-testing, science-based methods will be very effective for the mature stockpile. Many new
diagnostic tools such as the National Ignition Facility will be developed at the three weapons labs
and at the Nevada Test Site. Supercomputers with thousands of times the present speed and
memory will be used for three-dimensional simulations of nuclear explosions. Lastly, subcritical
hydronuclear tests will allow the weapon designers continued opportunities to maintain their skills.

Question III 9: Performance Enhancements
Is it possible to enhance the reliability of aging primaries beyond their design lifetimes in
order to save money?

Answer 111.9:
By increasing the amount of tritium in the primary, extra boosting is obtained to further
ensure that a very old primary could still trigger the associated secondary. In this way the reliabil
ity of older weapons can be enhanced to reduce the frequency of remanufacture, and thus save
money. 10

Question IIllO: Purpose ofReliability
The United States will have approximately 3500 accountable strategic warheads under
START n, and more than twice that number under START I. Consider four hypothetical
scenarios: an attack against the United States by an NWS,an attack against the United States by an
NNWS, a u.s. first strike against an NWS, and a U.S. first strike against an NNWS. Which
scenario requires the highest level of reliability?

U.S. Congress, Trident II Missiles: Capability, Costs, and Alternatives (Washington, DC: Con
gressional Budget Office, July 1986).
9

10

''Nuclear Testing," Jason Report #JSR-95-320.
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Answer III 10:
The highest reliability requirement would be for a first strike against an NWS to minimize
the response--a second strike. A U. S. retaliation to a first strike by an NWS would not have to be
as reliable because many of the enemy silos would then be empty and because cities are soft tar
gets. A U.S. first strike against an NNWS would not require very reliable weapons since the stra
tegic targets are few and soft. Of course the United States has given negative security assurances
that we would not launch first against an NNWS (except in a special case; see Answer 1.4). A U.S.
nuclear response to an NNWS attack would not require great reliability because the targets are soft
and few and the launchers would be empty. Since nuclear weapons are meant to deter the actions
of others, it is the perception of high reliability by other nations (and not'the actual reliability) that
deters nations. What is the most important purpose of reliability? It is ironic that the highest level
of reliability needed would be for a first strike and not for a deterrent second strike.

IV. WARHEAD SAFETY

Conclusions:
U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons have to date been very safe, as no one has been killed by
nuclear yield from weapons accidents since 1945 in over one million nuclear-weapon-years of
experience by the Americans and the Soviets. Since bombers no longer fly with nuclear weapons,
the most dangerous cause of accidents has been removed. The cost per life saved of replacing
existing warheads with new designs is many orders of magnitude higher than what is normally
spent in medical practice or safety regulations. Officials from both the Reagan and Bush adminis
trations have testified that potential safety problems were not severe enough to build new war
heads and missiles. For these reasons, the issue of further testing for safety has disappeared from
the CTBT debate.

Question IV.i: Accidents with Nuclear Weapons
What significant accidents have occurred involving U.S. nuclear weapons since World War
II? Were there radioactive releases, and were people injured or killed from the radioactivity?

Answer IV. 1:
According to the DOE there have been 32 accidents (31 prior to 1968 and one in 1980)
involving U. S. nuclear weapons. 11 None of these resulted in a nuclear detonation or any nuclear
yield despite severe stresses on the weapons. Only two accidents-at Palomares, Spain in 1966
and Thule, Greenland in 1968-released significant amounts of radioactivity. All but three of the
32 accidents involved aircraft, which no longer fly with puclear weapons aboard. Of the three
nonaircraft accidents, the accident at an igloo storage in Texas released little contamination and the
two accidents with ICBMs released no radioactivity. No one has been killed by radiation expo
sure, and doses have not been significant over some one-million weapon years of American and
Soviet nuclear weapon experience.

S. Drell and B. Peurifoy, "Technical Issues of a Nuclear Test Ban," Annual Review ofNuclear
andParticle Science 44 (1994): 285-327.
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Question IV. 2: How Safe is Safe?
What is the DOE criteria for a "safe" nuclear weapon?
Answer IV. 2:
DOE defines "safe" as the probability of less than a one-in-a-billion chance per warhead
life of prematurely detonating with a yield of more than four pounds of TNT (nuclear equivalent)
prior to launch under normal conditions and less than one-in-a-million per accident under abnor
mal conditions such as a fire or a crash. Two independent strong links, each with a failure rate of.
111,000 in an accident, gives the one-in-a-million figure. 12 One link uses a read-only chip to arm
the weapon and the other requires a zero gravity trajectory.
Question IV. 3: Safety Features and CostlBenefit Analysis ofSafety
What features can be added to warheads to make them safe? What are the costs and bene
fits of replacing the U. S. stockpile with new, safer weapons?
Answer IV. 3:
The three enhanced safety improvements that can be added to warheads in the enduring
U.S. nuclear arsenal are: insensitive high explosives, fire-resistant pits and enhanced nuclear deto
nation safety (ENDS, which isolates electrical systems in an accident).13 These, and many other of
the 1990 Drell Nuclear Safety Report recommendations, have been implemented in some systems,
such as the procedure for loading Trident missiles without warheads and only then emplacing the
warheads. 14
The Drell report did not take into account the costs of new warheads and missiles versus
the potential health benefit from their recommendations. In 1992, W. Isard calculated that it would
take about $200 million to save a (statistical) life if the United States were to modernize the
arsenal with safer warheads and missiles,ls This figure is about 1,000 times more costly to save a
life than what is spent for some expensive medical procedures. During my tenure at the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, I was told by Los Alamos in 1992 that they estimated a comparable
value of about $300 million to save a life. The Weapon Safety Value Assessment (WESVA) deci
sion tool is used to estimate the probability and severity of various accident scenarios. Because the
estimated costlbenefit ratios appeared very high, the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Act of 1992 required
the President to carry out "an analysis of the costs and benefits ofinstalling such [safety] feature or

12
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features in the warhead" before he could carry out nuclear tests on new warheads with enhanced
safety features. This law did not set a dollar level for the cost/benefit ratio, it merely mandated
that the calculations be done.
The Isard values may be too low in that they use the Fetter and von Hippel probability of
0.1 percent per year rate, which is based on the two large plutoilium releases from accidents with
U.S. aircraft. 16 I would agree with former Assistant Secretary ofEnergy Claytor, who argued that
extrapolating from two aircraft accidents exaggerates the risks since our bombers no longer fly
with nuclear weapons in peacetime. In addition, when one considers that no lives have been lost
after a million weapon-years of American and Soviet experience, and that these warheads were
less safe than the present ones, I believe that the $200 million cost per life saved is considerably
too low.

Question IV. 4: Military Views on Testingfor Safety
How do the Navy and Air Force view the benefits ofpossible major safety modifications ,to
U.S. warheads?

Answer IV. 4:
Officials from both the Bush and Clinton Defense Departments have testified that potential
safety problems were not severe enough to build new warheads and missiles.
Robert Barker, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, March 27, 1992:
The Air Force and Navy, in cooperation with the Office ofthe Secretary ofDefense
and the Department of Energy, evaluated the safety of all ballistic missiles that
carry nuclear warheads. It was determined that there is not now sufficient evidence
to warrant our changing either warheads or propellants.
Undersecretary of Defense John Deutch, before the House Armed Services Committee, Military
Application ofNuclear Energy Panel, May 3, 1993:
.
[A]s chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council ... I would think that we are not
convinced that such safety improvement [i.e., adding insensitive high explosive to
the Trident warheads and modifying the missile] would be worth the very consid
erable cost [of over three billion dollars].
Rear Admiral John T. Mitchell, Director, Strategic Systems Program Office, U.S. Navy, before the
Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Nuclear Deterrence, Anns Control and
Defense Intelligence, May 11, 1993:

S.Fetter and F. von Hippel, "The Hazard from Plutonium Dispersal by Nuclear-warhead Acci
dents," Science and Global Security 2 (1990): 21-41.
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[W]e believe there would be no gain in safety in changing to insensitive high explo
sive [on the W88 warhead in the event of a third stage detonation of the Trident
D-5 missile].

V. VERIFICATION

Conclusions:
The combination of the near real-time Primary Seismic Network, the Auxiliary Seismic
Network of broad-band triple-axis seismographs, and regional seismic monitoring stations will be
able to detect and identity fully-coupled nuclear explosions down to a yield of one kiloton TNT
equivalent. In many geographical regions the detection threshold is considerably better than one
kiloton, and global capabilities will improve with time. The CTBT verification regime can adapt
to changing political conditions by focusing on areas where nuclear proliferation is suspected.
Attempted clandestine testing by exploding at the one kiloton level in a cavity would only be
attempted by a very technologically sophisticated state, since yield excursions, venting, detection
by national technical means, and other issues arise.

Question J/:l: Seismic Capabilities

.

What are the seismic capabilities of the Primary Network of 50 stations, the Auxiliary Net
work of 120 broad-band, three-component seismograph stations, and the regional networks?

Answer J/:l:
Using all of the seismic capabilities available, nuclear explosions will be detected with
high confidence (90% certainty) down to seismic magnitudes (mb) of about 4. This magnitude cor
responds to that of a tamped explosion of about 1 kiloton in hard rock. However, this assessment
is too cautious in that it does not take into account the combination of teleseismic stations (more
than 2200 Ian away) with the regional stations. By combining the capabilities of the Primary,
Auxiliary, and regional networks (now available in many locations), one can improve the detection
threshold to about 3 mb, corresponding to a nuclear explosion with a yield of mere tenths of a
kiloton. The more open process of CTBT monitoring by many nations should incorporate the sup
plemental data from regional seismographs to reduce the CTBT measuring threshold and improve
the location determinations.
The teleseismic mb level to identify an event as a nuclear weapon and not an earthquake is
generally about 0.5 units higher than the detection threshold. Model calculations carried out at
Sandia National Laboratory by Claassen show that the Primary Network of 50 stations should have
a detection threshold range of3.25 to 3.5 ~ in central Eurasia, and below 4 ~ for the remainder
of the Earth (except for Antarctica and some southern islands, where it is 4.25 mb).17 Claassen
required that three or more stations detect seismic P-wave (primus) arrivals with a 99%
probability. This detection criterion was specifically used because it admits only a 1% probability
in missed detection, as opposed to the more conventionally used 10% value. It should be noted

J.P. Claassen, "Performance Estimates of the CD Proposed International Seismic Monitoring
System," 18th Annual Seismic Research Symposium on Monitoring a CTBr (4-6 September 1996),
Environmental Research Papers, No. 1195, pp. 676-84.
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that in a recent study the detection threshold of regional seismic networks near the Nevada test site
was about 2.4 lllt" about 1.5 units lower than that for the more distant teleseismic systems (ffit> = 4)
for now-known, previously undeclared nuclear explosions. IS If there is a suspicious region, a
neighboring state can place a regional seismograph close to the suspected region and the ability to
monitor will improve. Finally, large chemical explosions are readily detectable since they are
generally not spherical explosions, but rather ripple-fired in a linear array in order to greatly
reduce costs for breaking rock and to reduce off-site damage. In order to lessen misunder
standings, there will be voluntary notifications of chemical explosions larger than 0.3 kilotons.

Question V.2: High Confidence and Deterrence
The error bars discussed above for threshold seismic values are usually quoted in terms of
high confidence limits, with a confidence of 90%. What do these higher confidence levels mean in
terms of the threshold levels for the detection of nuclear weapons and for psychological deter
rence?

Answer V.2:
The U. S. Intelligence Community quotes higher threshold mb values (larger yields) in order
to claim "high confidence." One usually describes the limits of measurement, the error bars, as
one standard deviation (0), but for the case of "high confidence" one insists that some 90% ofthe
events are discovered, which corresponds to two standard deviations. If the confidence level were
lowered to about 50%, then the threshold level would be reduced by about 0.5 for regions with
good seismic coverage and by 0.25 for regions with poorer coverage. It probably is useful to quote
higher lllt, thresholds with more certainty, since would-be cheaters would know that a 90% chance
ofidentification corresponds to only a 10% probability of not being identified.

Question V. 3: Cavities
How easy would it be for a nation to hide a nuclear explosion in a cavity?19 What diameter
cavity would be needed to decouple (muffle) a nuclear explosion of 1 or 30 kilotons? What are the
technical risks for the covert tester?

Answer V.3:
There are very few data on decoupled tests in cavities; only one has been carried out with
a yield greater than one kiloton. If a nuclear weapon is placed in a cavity of sufficient size, such
that the blast pressure on the cavity wall is below the elastic limit of the surrounding media, the
seismic signal strength can be reduced by a factor of about 7 at 20 Hz, and 70 at lower frequencies.
(The Soviet test at Azgir had a reduction of only a factor of lOin magnitude at low frequencies.)
The cavity size necessary to obtain these decoupling factors has a radius of 20-25 meters per
cube-root kiloton. Thus, a 30 let explosion would need a cavity radius of 60-75 m (the size ofa 25

v.v.
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story building) to achieve full decoupling-an extraordinary engineering challenge when one
considers the requirement for secrecy. Many experts have concluded that the higher frequencies of
the decoupled signal would still be detectable and identifiable with regional seismographs. If a 1
let weapon had an unexpected yield of 5 let, which is quite possible for a new, clandestine program,
it would require a cavity radius of35-45 meters (diameter of 70-90 meters), a factor of 1.7 larger
than for the 1 let cavity (a volume 5 times greater).
The tester's problems would be further complicated by possible venting of radioactivity,
which could be easily detected; 30% of Soviet tests vented and the United States had severe
venting problems with its earliest tests. 20 In particular, it appears that smaller tests can be harder to
contain than larger ones. The last four U.S. explosions that vented were from tests with yields of
less than 20 kilotons. It is hypothesized that smaller explosions do not sufficiently glassify the
cavity and also do not rebound sufficiently to close fractures with a stress cage. Thus, the smaller
explosions, which one might think were easier to hide, are more likely to vent and could be
detected by the release of radioactivity. For these same reasons, it is further hypothesized that par
tially decoupled tests would also be difficult to completely contain.
Other intelligence means, such as satellites and electronic intelligence gathering, can also
gather evidence on brine pumping, excavation, equipment for monitoring tests, and other factors.
Only a very technologically sophisticated nation could conduct that a clandestine test of a kiloton
(or larger) that was decoupled to a degree that enabled the test to escape detection by seismic
means and that did not have yield excursions and venting.

Question 11: 4: Infrasound, Hydroacoustics, Radionuclide, Electromagnetic Pulse, National Tech
nical Means, and On-Site Inspection Monitoring
What monitoring technologies other than seismic exist to determine CTBT compliance?

Answer 11:4:
.The International Monitoring System will also incorporate 60 infrasound stations (global
threshold detection of about 1 kiloton in the atmosphere), 11 hydroacoustic stations (global detec
tion ofmuch less than a kiloton in the ocean), and 80 radionuclide stations (global detection ofless
than 1 kiloton in the atmosphere, and capabilities to detennine venting from underground explo
sions). In addition the United States presently monitors with satellites for optical electromagnetic
pulse (EMP) and nuclear radiation signatures from nuclear weapon tests above the surface of the
earth. In addition the national technical means (NTM) of satellite reconnaissance, human intelli
gence, and signals intelligence will combine synergistically to make the intelligence whole greater
than the sum of its parts both to deter cheating and to enhance detection and identification.
States Parties can call for an on-site inspection (OSI) to examine the location of a suspi
cious event. If a nation were considering testing a nuclear weapon, it would have to be confident
that it would have sufficient internal security to prevent knowledge of the test from being obtained
by all these technologies and the intelligence community of any State Party to the CTBT. A 50%
chance of detection of a sub-kiloton test might seem like weak monitoring to the CrnT States
Parties, but it would seem like a risky endeavor to the cheating nation. On-site inspections are

Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, "Seismic Verification of
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Explosions," OTA-ISC-414, 1989.
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useful for at least four reasons: OSls can (1) catch cheating, (2) raise the cost of cheating, (3) deter
cheating, and (4) confirm NTM data. A guilty nation probably would not allow an OSI to take
place, but this refusal, coupled with other evidence, would indicate guilt.

VI. VERIFICATION-COMPLIANCE PROCESS

Conclusions
The definition of "effective verification," as defined by Paul Nitze of the Reagan adminis
tration and James Baker of the Bush administration, includes the criteria of military significance of
potential violations and timely warning to overcome such military threats. By this definition, the
CTBT is clearly verifiable. The CTBT States Parties have legal mechanisms to strongly sanction
(as in the case ofIraq) those States Parties that violate the CTBT by conducting nuclear test explo
sions.
Question Vll: Effective Verification
How much verification is enough? What was the definition of"effective verification" used
by the Reagan and Bush administrations when establishing the criteria to determine the sufficiency
of verification?
Answer VI. 1:
In 1988 Ambassador Paul Nitze defined "effective verification" as follows:

What do we mean by "effective" verification? We mean that we want to be sure
that if the other side moves beyond the limits of the Treaty in any militarily signifi
cant way, we would be able to detect such violation in time to respond effectively
and thereby deny the other side the benefit ofthe violation. 21 ,
In 1992 Secretary of State James Baker expanded the definition of "effective verification" to be:

If the other side attempts to move beyond the limits of the Treaty in any militarily
significant way, we would be able to detect such a violation well before it becomes
a threat to national security so that we are able to respond. Additionally, the verifi
cation regime should enable us to detect patterns of marginal violations that do not
present immediate risk to U.S. security. However, no verification regime can be
expected to provide firm guarantees that all violations will be detected imme
diately.22
Nitze points out that verification cannot be expected to catch all forms of cheating, but that it must
be good enough to detect a violation in time to allow the United States to make a military response
before the violation becomes militarily significant. Baker echoes this definition, but points out·
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that verification should also be able to detennine patterns of marginal misbehavior. It makes logi
cal sense to apply this same standard for the quality of verification to the CTBT.

Question VI.2: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty vs. the Threshold Test Ban Treaty
In what ways is it easier (and harder) to determine treaty compliance to the CTBT than the
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)?

Answer VI. 2:
By quantitying a specific yield threshold in kilotons, one must be able to accurately deter
mine the conversion from fit, units to kilotons. This was initially a difficult task at 150 kilotons for
the TTBT. Since the CTBT does not have a limit in kilotons, the question is easier, since it is not
What is the particular yield?, but rather, Was it a nuclear explosion? On the other hand, at levels
less than a kiloton down to zero, the seismic monitoring becomes more difficult. At this point, the
national technical means (NTM) of verification, using satellites, intercepts of phone calls, apd
other means, come into play.

Question VI.3: Threshold Test Ban Treaty Compliance
In 1990 the Administration reversed' its finding that the Soviets had likely violated the
TTBT. What were the 1990 and subsequent findings on this issue?

Answer VI. 3:
The primary confusion on the TTBT compliance issues was caused by the (now) incorrect
government estimate ofthe seismic bias factor, which takes into account the geological differences
between the United States and former Soviet test sites. The U.S. test site in Nevada is on newer
geological strata that better absorb the seismic waves, reducing the fit, values. On the other hand,
the Soviet site in Kazakhstan is on older geological strata, which absorb much less seismic
strength, giving larger mb values. Thus, weapons with the same yield produce explosions with
higher ~ values at the Soviet site than at the American site. This was interpreted as excessive
Soviet yields beyond the 150 kiloton TTBT limit, with the charge that the Soviets had "likely"
violated the TTBT. U.S. geophysicists had long predicted the "bias" difference between the sites
would give a false reading in this manner. In 1988 the Joint Verification Experiment was carried.
out by using Corrtex measurements at the two sites. These measurements convinced the executive
branch that the geophysicists were correct on the value of the bias between the two sites. Finally
in 1990, the Bush administration reversed the former finding of a "likely" violation. This reversal
allowed the TTBT to be ratified and entered into force, and the CTBT negotiations to begin.

Question VI.4: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Violation
If a CTBT States Party is suspected of having tested a nuclear weapon, what recourse do
the other CTBT States Parties have? How would the international process move forward?

Answer VI.4:
The data from the International Monitoring System (IMS) and NTM data (consistent with
international law-no data from spying) will be transferred to the International Data Center.
These data are open to all States Parties, who individually must first come to their own conclusions
on the meaning of the data as the IMS does not make compliance findings. Each States Party has
the right to request an on-site inspection on the territory of the suspected nation. The Executive
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Council of 51 nations must respond within 96 hours. At least 30 ofthe 51 members ofthe Council
must vote affinnatively for the OSI to go forward. For the case of a possible violation of the
CTBT, the Conference of all the States Parties will determine if a state is in noncompliance with
the CTBT, and determine collective measures that are in conformity with international law. Alternatively, the Conference or the Executive Council may bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions to the attention of the United Nations for resolution and action. As in the
case of the 1991 Middle East War, the UN can impose harsh sanctions on a violator such as Iraq.
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